The constructive referendum, by contrast, which will be discussed below, differs in both aspects. It provides us with full information about the collective preference order. And it is reform-friendly: supporting a reform option that wins a greater share of individual preferences than the status quo.
Introduction
A Condorcet cycle, or cyclical majority, is defined as a situation where a group of voters is called upon to decide between three (or more) alternatives. From several individual transitive preference orders, a collective intransitive preference order takes shape. Such paradoxes are vividly discussed in the public choice literature (Black 1958; Sen 1970; Gehrlein 2006 , and many others), but empirical instances are actually quite difficult to find. Most voting procedures do not record individual voters' full preference orders (Nurmi 1998; Nurmi 1999: 25; Gehrlein 2006: 33) . Multi-option referendums, which have recently become more widespread in Swiss cantons, represent one procedure where voters actually do express a full order of their preferences over three options -and where the collective preference order is therefore visible in the results.
This study explains the mechanism of the constructive referendum, the multi-option referendum practiced in several Swiss cantons, and documents the occurrence of a majority cycle in a 2004 referendum vote in the canton of Bern.
Bern. While data do not allow us to study the voting behavior of individuals, I use results from the 389 municipalities -mainly transitive -to show that the aggregation of fully transitive preference orders at the municipal level led to a majority cycle at the cantonal level.
Previous research
Consider a situation with three discrete decision options -a, b, c -and three voters -1, 2, 3. Suppose voter 1 has the preference order a>b>c, voter 2 the order b>c>a, and voter 3 the order c>a>b. The aggregation of these three preference orders results in a majority (voters 1 and 3) that favors a over b. A majority of the voters (1 and 2) also favor b over c, but nevertheless, a majority (voters 2, 3) favor c over a. This result represents a cyclic majority, or a Condorcet cycle, and there is no option that would win against any other option if they were compared pair-wise. While each of the individual votes is fully transitive, the sum of these votes proves to be intransitive. This paradox, and possible solutions to it, have fascinated many scholars, and have been discussed widely in the public choice literature (Black 1958; Sen 1970; Gehrlein and Fishburn 1976; Riker 1982; Saari 2001 , and many others). The broader field, which centers on the stability of majority decision-making, has been described by Green and Shapiro (1994: 113) as one "that reflects the imbalance between theory and empirical research". Empirically, very few instances of fully documented Condorcet cycles have been identified. Many empirical studies that rely on full information about voters' preference orders, about multi-option decisions that resulted in the selection of one candidate or option, did not provide any evidence of a Condorcet paradox (for instance, Chamberlin, et al. 1984; Feld and Grofman 1988; Feld and Grofman 1992; Tullock 1981 ).
Often, the Condorcet cycles described in empirical work rely on assumed or polled preference orders, instead of real voting results (Riker 1958; Riker 1982; Lagerspetz 1997; Gaubatz 1995; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2001 , to name a few; see Gehrlein 2006: chapter 2, for an overview). Mackie (2003) has been a particularly vocal critic -suggesting that many of these assumptions do not hold, and that the empirical evidence is weak. Grofman (2004: 36-7) argues that most of the existing research relies on the impartial culture assumption (assuming a not connected random probability of each preference order), or on closely related distributions, which are empirically implausible.
There are several theoretical reasons that explain why Condorcet cycles might be rare. Black (1958) has shown that when voters have single-peaked preference orders (meaning that decisions are taken along a single-dimensional issue dimension), Condorcet cycles do not emerge. In addition, it has been shown that they can be prevented through logrolling (Tullock 1981) . However, there is scant evidence that the opposite effect may be true as well, and strategic voting or strategic amendments can be used to cause cyclical majorities intentionally, in order to affect the outcome of a vote (Riker 1958; Senti 1998, among others) .
1 Well-established decision-making processes in consolidated political systems might prevent the emergence of Condorcet cycles (cf. Shepsle 1979; Andrews 2002) . Hence, it is not surprising that cycling is rare in established democracies, and that cycling majorities occur most often in countries with a weak institutional order, a weak governing majority, and in the absence of a dominant, one-dimensional conflict.
Even if Condorcet cycles were present in the preferences of an electorate, they remain difficult to detect in most voting situations. The voting procedures used to select one out of several mutually exclusive options generally do not allow voters to fully express their preference order (Gehrlein 2006: 33 Other have relied on assumed -rather than measured -preference orders of electors (Lagerspetz 1997) . In addition, a number of researchers have employed simulations based on the assumption of impartial culture in order to estimate the probability of encountering a cycling majority. Jones et al. (1995) , Van Deemen (1999) and Regenwetter et al. (2006: 50) show that, under the disputed assumption of impartial culture (each voter preference is equally likely), and for large samples of voters, Condorcet cycles are extremely rare.
Referendums with several alternatives in the Swiss constitutional practice
Voting procedures figure strongly in whether Condorcet paradoxes are visible or not; this procedure is more likely to lead to reforms when majority cycles occur. The usually employed amendment procedure opts for the status quo in the case of majority cycles.
In the period since Bern first instituted the constructive referendum, two more Swiss cantons (Zurich and Nidwalden) have followed. In the other cantons and at the national level, the constructive referendum remains unavailable as a means of decision-making.
The referendum-with-people's-amendment has substantially increased the number of multi-option referendums. This can be traced to two main reasons. Before the new procedure was introduced, the possibility of multi-option votes had been restricted to occasions where the parliament opted for such a procedure. Essentially, it was used only rarely -when the parliament decided to counter a popular initiative (a new law
proposed by a committee of voters) with its own counterproposal. 
The Condorcet cycle of the 28 November 2004
On 28 November 2004, the canton of Bern held a referendum vote on a revision of the law on state employees. Two alternative amendments were presented in opposition to the status quo: the proposal of the cantonal parliament, and the "people's amendment", which was proposed by a referendum committee. According to the voting procedure in the canton of Bern, which follows from the new national rules, voters were asked three questions: first, they were asked whether they preferred the parliamentary proposal over the status quo (Yes/No vote). In the second question, they were asked for their preference on the people's amendment (Yes/No). And third, they were asked which of the two reforms (the parliamentary one or the people's proposal) they favored (see Nevertheless, a majority of voters favored the people's amendment over the amendment of the parliament (Table 1) . According to the voting rules, the reform of the parliament was accepted, even though a majority of voters would have favored the people's amendment over the parliamentary one. In short, the optional referendum of November 2004 resulted in a cycling majority.
xxx Table 1 about here. xxx
The content of the proposals
The referendum in question involved a reform project aimed at changing the system by which state employees' salaries were increased. While the amount of money proposed for salary increases was equal across the status quo and both reform projects, the proposed mechanism of increase differed substantially. Under the status quo (SQ), there was an automatic yearly salary increase for all employees. The parliament, however, Table 2 gives an overview over the voting recommendations by the political parties and associations.
xxx Table 2 about here. xxx
Reconstructing the majority cycle from municipal voting results
In the press, the contradictory aggregated result was perceived as a proof of voter confusion over referendums with several alternatives. It was suggested that some voters filled in the referendum ballot in an intransitive and thus irrational way. Referendum results are available only at the aggregated level (by municipalities), and there is no information about the individual ballots -therefore, we cannot establish how many ballots were cast with intransitive preference order. While it is impossible to disaggregate the result -and to ascertain the responses of individual voters -we can consider the results of 389 municipalities (see Table 3 ). Based on this, I argue that the intransitive result at the cantonal level arises from an aggregation of fully transitive preference orders at the municipal level.
xxx Include table 3 here xxx There are six transitive ways in which the questions might be answered. 5 The preferences of political parties and associations were expressed only in two of them. Because of this, it seems prudent to assume that these options were chosen by the largest part of Preferences for two transitive patterns, which plausibly might have attracted a few votes, can, jointly with votes for the two recommendations of the political parties and associations, result in a majority cycle. The order SQ > VV > GR reflects voters who clearly favor automatic salary increments over any form of performance-based system.
The order VV > GR > SQ would be the rational choice of voters who are located between VV and GR and closer to VV than to GR. These are voters who would favor salary increments based on performance rather than automation, but who simultaneously agree that a compromise is better than an extreme solution. Both rankorders are plausible and rational. Jointly with the rank-order that was recommended by the right-wing parties and business associations, GR > SQ > VV, they result in the Condorcet cycle, which reflects the overall outcome of the referendum.
It is plausible that a substantial part of the vote was divided equally between both options that were recommended by the parties and associations, GR > SQ > VV or VV > SQ > GR; this would constitute roughly 100,000 votes for each of both rank orders. We should consider the fact that, in decisions that consist of several questions, it is possible for a winning combination to emerge that has not been voted for by a single voter. The voting procedure in Bern requires voters to answer three distinct, but interconnected questions. If a decision is linked to multiple questions, then with each additional question, the likelihood increases that the overall decision will be one that has been supported by very few, or even no voters at all. This phenomenon is described in detail in the 'paradox of multiple elections' (Brams, et al. 1997; Brams, et al. 1998 ). to communicate why the electorate should favor the parliamentary proposal over a compromise solution. 8 In short, it appears plausible that the right-wing parties' recommendation was primarily strategically driven, in order to allow their first preference GR to win the vote. In this case, it is likely that only a few voters voiced a sincere preference order GR>SQ>VV, while most of the other voters of this group were casting a strategic vote. If only a small part of these voters had voted sincerely, the Condorcet paradox would not have emerged.
Conclusions
Despite the prominence of the majority cycles paradox in the public choice literature, their occurrence has rarely been documented (Green and Shapiro 1994: 113) . Multioption referendums are practiced infrequently, and parliaments and committees usually apply multi-option decision procedures. As stated above, these do not reveal a full ordering of preferences.
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on majority cycles, documenting a new referendum type that has been introduced recently in several Swiss cantons -the referendum-with-people's-amendment. It allows for multi-option referendums, and, because it relies on a full pair-wise comparison of these options on the ballot, it makes majority cycles directly visible. Interestingly enough, the result of one of the first cases of a referendum-with-people's-amendment was a majority cycle.
As In a different vein: strategic amendments might also help to result in Condorcet paradoxes, and change the outcome of a decision (Riker 1958 ). 2 Rather than directly opposing several reform projects, some democracies present several inter-connected reform projects to the voters on the same day or on subsequent ballots. These are not connected to the same referendum question, however, and voters decide these issues separately. Brams et al. (1998) warn that this procedure does not allow for an adequate representation of preferences, since decisions on several dimensions of the vote might rely on each other. Higley and McAllister (2002) discuss a rare case of a multi-option referendum in Australia. 3 If three or more reform options gain a majority of votes over the status quo, then optional questions about the reform proposals decide which proposal is accepted.
The winner is the one that wins a majority of votes over the other proposals in most of the optional questions. If several proposals win in the same number of optional questions (in the case of a Condorcet cycle), the one with the highest number of votes in the optional questions is accepted (Gesetz über die politischen Rechte, amendment of 1994, Art. 59e).
In one possible case, the constitution of 1993 (article 63) restricts the possibility of an optional referendum to three options. This is the case if the parliament submits two options of a law to the referendum. Here, an additional people's proposal would not be allowed. However, it is unclear what happens in the case of several people's proposals. 4 At the national level, the procedure was abolished in 1987; see Linder (1999: 249) . 5 Not considering seven additional combinations, where two or three options are ranked equally. 6 A typical example of this is a reform package that consists of several partial reforms, all of which are supported by a -different -majority of voters. While each of these reforms attains majority support, the package might not win against the status quo (see Andrews 2002 for examples). In such situations, a Condorcet cycle emerges. 7 Shafir et al. (1989) make a similar argument for individuals who are asked to choose between two extreme benefit options and a compromise. (I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.) In the present example, where most voters do not preside over their own wages, but rather over the wages of others, even more complex considerations are possible. 8 The rejection of the people's amendment has made it possible to draw a black-andwhite picture of the subjects of the vote, in which the parliamentary proposal was recognized as desirable, the people's proposal as undesirable. Such a message might be easier to communicate to the voters. Supporting both reform proposals, but one
